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I. 
I~R~DuCI+I~N 
There  has  been  a marked  decrease  in  the  rate  of 
productivity  growth  in  the  United  States  and  other 
countries  since  the  early  1970s.  The  likely  reasons 
for  this  slowdown  have  been  surveyed  recently  in 
Cullison  (1989).  The  slowdown  shows  up  in  mea- 
sures  of  single  factor  (labor)  productivity  as well  as 
in  the  more  comprehensive  multifactor  measure, 
which  includes  the  productive  effects  of  labor  and 
capital  together.  For  example,  productivity  in  the 
U.S.  nonfarm  business  sector  only  rose  at  a  0.22 
percent  annual  average  rate  over  1973-87.  But  for 
the  2.5 years  prior  to  1973,  productivity  growth  was 
over  seven  times  larger  (at  1.68  percent  a year).  The 
slowdown  was even  more  striking  for  some  U.S.  ser- 
vice  sectors.  In  particular,  the  Finance,  Insurance, 
and  Real  Estate  (FIRE)  service  sector  experienced 
an  average  labor  productivity  growth  rate  that  was 
negative,  at  -0.41  percent  a year  over  1973-87.  In 
the  2.5 years  before  1973,  however,  this  growth 
averaged  1.41  a year  (Baily  and  Gordon,  1988,  pp. 
355,  395). 
Banking  makes  up  20 percent  of the  FIRE  service 
sector  (net  of owner-occupied  housing)  and thus  con- 
tributes  importantly  to  this  sector’s  behavior.  The 
purpose  of this  paper  is to provide  estimates  of total 
factor  productivity  for  the  banking  service  sector 
over  the  past  decade  (1977-87)  and  to  investigate 
the  cause  of  the  low  productivity  growth  found. 
Productivity  results  are  reported  from  two  growth 
accounting  models:  one  based  on  a  production 
function  and  another  based  on  a cost  function.  Both 
approaches  indicate  a similarly  low  rate  of  produc- 
tivity  advance  for  the  banking  industry,  ranging  be- 
tween  -  0.07  (production  approach)  to  0.6  percent 
(cost  approach)  a year. 
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It  is argued  that  low productivity  growth  in bank- 
ing is largely  due  to  the  effects  of bank  deregulation 
initiated  in the  early  1980s.  Deregulation  permitted 
the  establishment  of new  interest-bearing  consumer 
checking  accounts  and  eliminated  ceilings  on  time 
and  savings  deposit  interest  rates.  Deregulation 
during  the  198Os,  preceded  by  the  intensive  use  of 
cash  management  techniques  by  corporations  in 
the  197Os,  effectively  removed  banks’  virtual 
monopoly  control  over  zero-interest  checking  ac- 
counts  and  low-interest  small  consumer  time  and 
savings  deposits.  Core  deposit  interest  costs  rose  but 
were  not  offset  by  either  reduced  costs  elsewhere 
or  with  an  expansion  in  measured  bank  output. 
Apparently,  market  share  considerations  limited  the 
desire  by  banks  to reduce  operating  costs  enough  to 
fully  offset  the  rise  in  interest  expenses. 
While  banks  may  have  experienced  very  low  (to 
negative)  productivity  growth,  users  of banking  ser- 
vices  have  benefited.  But  the  benefits,  which  are 
similar  to  an  increase  in  the  “quality”  of  banking 
output,  are  not  captured  in any  measure  of banking 
output.  Thus,  although  measured  bank  productivity 
growth  is low  or  negative,  it would  be  inappropriate 
to conclude  that  society  as a whole  has not  benefited. 
Rather,  there  has  been  a redistribution  of  produc- 
tivity  benefits  in which  users  of banking  services  have 
gained  at  the  expense  of  banks. 
II. 
PRODUCTIVITY  IS”OUTPUT  PERUNITOF 
INPUT,” BUT WHAT  Is BANK OUTPUT 
ANDWHATARETHEINPUTS? 
What  Do  Banks Produce? 
In  many  industries,  physical  measures  of  output 
and  inputs  are  readily  available  and,  importantly,  a 
consensus  also exists  on  how  best  to measure  them. 
In  the  electric  power  industry,  for  example,  the 
obvious  measure  of output  is kilowatt-hours  of elec- 
tricity  produced.  Inputs  used  to  produce  electric 
power  include  the  number  of workers,  the  real  value 
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the  tons  of fuel inputs  used.  In contrast,  in the  bank- 
ing sector  physical  measures  of output  are not  readily 
available  (although  they  exist  for  some  banks);  in- 
deed  no  strong  consensus  exists  regarding  what  it 
is  that  banks  produce.  As  a  result,  measures  of 
banking  productivity  can  use  different  definitions  of 
outputs  and  inputs. 
Banks  produce  a variety  of payment,  safekeeping, 
intermediation,  and  accounting  services  for  deposit 
and  loan  customers  (Benston  and  Smith,  1976; 
Mama&s,  1987).  Some  have  argued,  however,  that 
banks  primarily  produce  loans.  With  this  (asset) 
approach,  the production  of deposit  services  is viewed 
as merely  payment  in kind  for the  use  of funds  from 
which  to make  loans  (Sealey  and  Lindley,  1977).  In 
effect,  this  is a “reduced  form”  model  of the  bank- 
ing firm: the  production  of deposit  services  is treated 
as an intermediate  output  to depositors  who  provide 
loanable  funds,  so  deposit  services  are  netted  out. 
But  there  is  no  reason  to  focus  on  only  a  single 
banking  output  such  as loans,  especially  because  the 
production  of  deposit  services  accounts  for  half  of 
all  physical  capital  and  labor  input  expenditures. 
Because  deposit  services  are such  a large component 
of bank  value  added,  explicit  modeling  of their  pro- 
ductive  structure,  along  with  that  of loans,  will yield 
a more  accurate  description  of this  structure  for the 
bank  as  a  whole.  This  objective  can  be  achieved 
using  a structural  model  of a multiproduct  banking 
firm.  In  such  a  model,  the  production  of  deposit 
services  would  not  be  netted  out;  instead,  it would 
be  one  of  a  set  of  bank  outputs. 
For  purposes  of analysis,  banks  are  considered  to 
produce  payment  and safekeeping  outputs  (associated 
with  demand  deposits  and  savings  and  small  de- 
nomination  time  deposits)  as well  as intermediation 
and  loan  outputs  (associated  with  real  estate  loans, 
consumer  installment  and credit  card loans,  and com- 
mercial,  industrial,  and  agricultural  loans).  Over  the 
last  decade,  these  five deposit  and  loan  output  cate- 
gories  accounted  for  75  to  80  percent  of  value 
added  in banking  (Berger  and Humphrey,  forthcom- 
ing,  see  table).  Such  a  categorization  of bank  out- 
put,  with  one  exception  (time  deposits),  is consis- 
tent  with  that  identified  in  the  user  cost  approach 
to  determine  bank  inputs  from  outputs  (Hancock, 
1986;  Fixler  and  Zieschang,  forthcoming). 
Measures  of Bank  Output 
Based  on  data  availability,  there  are  at least  three 
different  measures  of banking  output  that  could  be 
used  in  productivity  analyses:  (1)  the  number  of 
transactions  processed  in deposit  and  loan  accounts 
(a flow measure);  (2) the  real or constant  dollar value 
of funds  in  the  deposit  and  loan  accounts  (a  stock 
measure):  or (3) the  numbers  of deposit  and loan ac- 
counts  serviced  by banks  (a stock  measure).’  Because 
output  is typically  a flow,  not  a stock,  the  preferred 
measure  is seemingly  an output  flow. Stock  measures 
would  only be used  if a flow measure  were  unavailable 
or because  the  stock  measure  might  be proportional 
(on  average)  to  a  flow  measure. 
A time-series  transactions  flow  measure  of aggre- 
gate  banking  output  is  compiled  by  the  Bureau  of 
Labor  Statistics  (BLS,  1989).  However,  this measure 
exists  only  for  the  aggregate  of all banks  and  has  a 
limited  number  of observations.  Thus  for most  pur- 
poses,  researchers  have  been  forced  to rely on stock 
measures  of bank  output  and  to  assume  that  there 
is a proportionality  between  stocks  and flows,  so use 
of stocks  succeeds  in approximating  flows.  Because 
one  possible  stock  measure-number  of deposit  and 
loan  accounts-is  essentially  unavailable  for  time- 
series  analysis,z  researchers  have  relied  on the  stock 
r A fourth  measure,  concerning  bank  debits  and  deposit  turnover 
(published  monthly  in  the  Federa/ Reserve Buh’etin),  should  not 
be  used.  These  data  are  in value  terms  and  include  both  check 
and  wire  transfer  debits.  As  a result,  the  virtually  exponential 
growth  in the  value  of wire  transfers  will grossly  dominate  this 
series,  even  though  wire  transfer  expenses  are a minute  portion 
of  total  bank  costs.  While  it  is  possible  to  remove  the  value 
of wire  transfer  debits,  the  end  result  would  be  a  measure  of 
the  value of check  and ACH  debits,  which  is inferior to the  quan- 
tity measure  of aggregate  check  and  ACH  transactions  captured 
in  the  transaction  flow  measure  discussed  immediately  below. 
* See  the  Appendix  for  more  detail  on  data  availability. 
Summary  of  Bank  Total  Factor 
Productivity  Estimates 
(annual  average  growth  rates;  1977-87) 
QT  QD 
Growth  Accounting  Method: 
Production  Function  -0.00%  -0.07% 
Cost  Function  0.60  0.50 
Econometric  Estimation  Method:’ 
Cost  Function: 
Hunter  &  Timme  (1991)  -  1.05 
Humphrey  (1991)  -  -  1.01 
1 Both of these studies used multiproduct indicators of bank output rather 
than  the  single aggregate  index QD.  Transactions flow data  (QTI are  not 
available  to  be  used  in  pooled times-series,  cross-section econometric 
analyses. 
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are  available  over  -time  and  for  each  bank  in  the 
United  States.  As a result,  cross-section  information 
can  be  pooled  over  time,  allowing  the  estimation  of 
more  sophisticated  econometric  models  than  is pos- 
sible with  any of the  other  measures  of bank  output. 
It  is  assumed,  but  has  never  been  tested,  that  the 
transaction  flow of bank  output  over  time  is propor- 
tional  to the  stock  of real  deposit  and  loan  balances 
(Box  1).3 That  these  two alternative  measures  of bank 
output  have  had  a somewhat  similar  variation  over 
the  last decade  is documented  below.  While  this does 
not  strongly  support  the  assumption  of strict  propor- 
tionality  between  bank  output  flow and  stock,  it does 
3 The  same  assumption  is  made  in  cross-section  studies  in 
banking  where  scale  economies  are  the  focus  of modeling  and 
estimation. 
Box  1 
When  Will  Stock and Flow  Measures  of 
Bank  Output Be Proportional 
to Each  Other? 
Stock  and  flow  measures  of banking  output 
will be  proportional  to one  another  when  only 
the  two  following  influences  determine  the 
growth  in  nominal  deposit  and  loan  balances 
over  time.  First,  nominal  deposit  and  loan 
balances  grow  because  of population  growth. 
An  expanding  population  leads  to  a larger  de- 
mand  for  bank  transaction  services  as  more 
deposit  accounts  are  opened,  more  checks  are 
written,  and  more  savings  deposits  and 
withdrawals  occur.  Thus,  over  time,  increased 
transaction  flows will be  associated  with  larger 
stocks  of deposit  balances.  Population  growth 
and  economic  expansion  also  leads  to  loan 
growth.  The  nominal  value  of the  stock  of bank 
loans  will  rise  as  new  loan  transactions  occur 
and  expand  at a greater  rate  than  outstanding 
loans  are  retired.  The  second  influence  is .in- 
flation,  which  raises  the  average  size  of loans 
made  and the  average  idle deposit  balances  held 
by  users  of  bank  services.  If  only  these  two 
influences  determine  the  variation  in nominal 
deposit  and  loan  balances,  then  deflation  by 
some  appropriate  price  index  will  give  the 
real  value  of  deposit  and  loan  balances  and 
also  reflect  the  underlying  flow  of  bank 
transactions. 
suggest  that  somewhat  similar  estimates  of produc- 
tivity  may  be  obtained  using  either  output  measure 
for  this  period.  This  point  is  demonstrated  below. 
Inputs Needed  to Produce Output 
There  is  less  controversy  on  measuring  bank 
inputs.  Labor  (number  of  workers  or  total  hours 
worked)  and  the  real  or  constant  dollar  value  of 
physical  capital  (usually  the  book  value  of premises, 
furniture,  and  equipment  deflated  by  some  price 
index)  clearly  represent  inputs  needed  to  produce 
bank  output.4  However,  there  is less agreement  about 
also  treating  the  real  or  constant  dollar  value  of 
loanable  funds-core  deposits  plus purchased  funds- 
as  an  input. 
If  labor  and  capital  were  the  only  inputs,  then 
measured  productivity  would  refer  to bank  operating 
costs.  Since  operating  costs  are  less  than  one-third 
of  total  banking  costs,  however,  an  operating  cost 
productivity  measure  by itself would  not  indicate  the 
degree  to  which  productivity  improvements  may 
affect  user  costs  or bank  profits.  More  importantly, 
since  capital  and labor operating  expenses  which  sup- 
port  a branch  network  are substitutes  for the  interest 
costs  of  purchased  funds  (federal  funds,  CDs, 
Eurodollars,  etc.),  operating  expenses  are  not  a 
stable  proportion  of total  costs  either  over  time  or 
(especially)  across  different-sized  banks.5  This 
instability  can  bias  productivity  estimates  derived 
solely  from  operating  expenses,  just  as  it has  been 
shown  to  bias  the  determination  of  bank  scale 
economies  (Humphrey,  1990).  Hence  the  appro- 
priate  cost  concept  from  which  to  estimate  bank 
productivity  is total  costs,  which  includes  operating 
plus  interest  expenses.  From  this  it follows  that  the 
five  appropriate  inputs  are  labor,  capital,  demand 
deposits,  small  time  and  savings  deposits,  and  pur- 
chased  funds.  Thus  a total  factor  measure  of produc- 
tivity  is  preferred1 
Unlike  other  industries,  total  costs  for an aggregate 
bank  cannot  be  determined  by  simply  summing  all 
costs  at  all banks.  Some  costs,  such  as  the  cost  of 
funds  purchased  from  other  banks  in the  interbank 
4 Researchers  familiar  with  the  many  problems  associated  with 
measuring  real  capita!  stock  will find  the  measurement  method 
employed  in  this  paper  to  be  overly  simple  and  potentially 
misleading.  Fortunately,  these  capital  measurement  problems 
will  have  only  a relatively  small  effect  on  the  banking  produc- 
tivity  results  because  the  share  of capital  expenditures  in  total 
cost  is  itself  small,  around  15 percent. 
5 Purchased  funds  permit  a bank  to grow  faster  and  attain  a larger 
size than  if it relied  solely on a base  of branch-generated  deposits. 
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individual  banks  but  need  to  be  excluded  when 
aggregate  data  are used.  This  exclusion  is necessary 
because  if there  were  only one aggregate  bank,  which 
is the  implicit  assumption  in using  aggregate  data  in 
the  type  of models  specified,  interbank  costs  would 
not  exist  and  total  costs  need  to  be  reduced  by  this 
amount.  The  cost  of funds  purchased  outside  of the 
U.S.  banking  system,  such  as virtually  all large CDs, 
Eurodollars,  and other  liabilities for borrowed  money, 
however,  would  remain. 
To  sum  up,  both  input  (cost)  and  output  (service 
flow  or  stock)  characteristics  of  core  deposits  are 
specified  (following  Wykoff,  1991),  rather  than 
only  one  or  the  other  as  is  usually  done  in  the 
literature.  In  contrast,  purchased  funds  have  only 
input  characteristics.  Overall,  five categories  of bank 




There  are  essentially  two  ways  to  measure  bank 
productivity.  The  growth  accounting  approach  (Box 
2)  uses  raw  data  on  input  and  output  growth  rates 
plus  information  on  input  cost  shares  while  an 
econometric  approach  specifies  a cost  or production 
function  relating  outputs  to inputs  and estimates  this 
relationship  statistically.  While  the  focus in this paper 
is  on  the  growth  accounting  approach,  results  of 
existing  econometric  studies  of bank  technical  change 
and  productivity  are  also  noted. 
The  data  necessary  to determine  banking  produc- 
tivity  from  growth  accounting  models  based  first  on 
a production  function  and  second  on a cost  function 
(both  shown  in Box  2) are  different  with  the  excep- 
tion  of the  measure  of bank  output.  In what  follows, 
the time-series  variation  of two bank  output  measures 
are  compared,  after  which  productivity  results 
based  on these  output  measures  in both  production 
and  cost-growth  accounting  models  are  then 
contrasted. 
Transactions  Flow  and Real Balance 
Stock Measures  of Bank  Output 
The  transaction  measure  of bank  output  used  here 
is  the  BLS  index  of  deposit  and  loan  transactions 
(QT).  In contrast,  the  stock  measure  is an  index  of 
the  real  value  of deposit  and  loan  account  balances 
Figure  1 
A  Comparison  of  Flow  and  Stock 
Measures  of  Banking  Output 
(1977-87  or  89;  1977=100) 
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(QD).6  Both  are  shown  in Figure  1. For  comparison 
purposes,  the  real  value  of total  bank  assets  (QTA) 
is  also  shown.7  Over  1977437,  the  annual  average 
rate  of growth  of QT  was  3.8  percent  while  that  for 
QD  was  almost  identical  at  3.7  percent.  But  the 
average  figures  can be misleading  since  QD  was very 
flat  in  the  early  1980s  but  grew  more  rapidly  than 
QT  at the  middle  of the  decade.  Thus  the  assumed 
proportionality  between  bank  transactions  flows (QT) 
and  the  stock  of real balances  (QD)  is only  approxi- 
mate  over  this  period  even  though  the  RZ between 
QT  and  QD  is relatively  high  (X2).  In comparison, 
QTA  grew  by only  2.7  percent  on an annual  average 
basis and,  if used  as a measure  of banking  output  here 
(as some  have  argued),  would  understate  the  exban- 
sion  of  bank  output  compared  with  the  other  two 
measures.8  Such  understatement  holds  even  though 
the  R2 between.QT  and  QTA  is higher  (.97)  than 
that  between  QT  and  QD. 
A  Production-Based Measure  of 
Banking Productivity 
The  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  computes  annu- 
ally  an  aggregate  measure  of  labor  productivity  in 
6 The  construction  of both  of these  indexes  are described  in the 
Appendix.  The  BLS  data  are available  only through  1987 (BLS, 
1989). 
’ Real  total  assets  were  obtained  by deflating  the  nominal  value 
of  total  banking  assets  by  the  GNP  deflator. 
s Since  interbank  sales  of funds  (e.g.,  federal  funds  sold)  have 
grown  over  time  and  show  up in total  assets,  the  aggregate  value 
of these  assets  will  be  overstated  by  this  amount  compared  to 
a situation  where  there  is  only  one  aggregate  bank  and  inter- 
bank  sales  no  longer  appear  on  the  balance  sheet.  Thus  the 
understatement  possible  when  using  total  assets  as an indicator 
of aggregate  bank  output  is even  greater  than  that  shown  in the 
figure  since  these  total  asset  values  have  not  been  corrected  for 
this  double  counting. 
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TFP(QT)  = Total factor  productivity  with  transactions 
flow  output 
TFP(QD)  = Total  factor  productivity  with  real  balance 
stock  output 
LP(QT)  = Labor  productivity  with  transactions 
j-low  output 
banking  using  transactions  (QT)  as  its  measure  of 
output.  This  series,  LP(QT),  is shown  in Figure  2. 
Cyclical  behavior  of labor productivity  is due to cycles 
in bank  output  transactions  flows,  specifically  cycles 
in  new  loans  being  made  as  deposit  transaction 
growth  was  always  positive.9 
Over  the  1977-87  period,  the  average  annual  in- 
crease  in numbers  of workers  was 2.4 percenti  while 
banking  output  (QT)  rose  by an average  3.8  percent. 
Because  output  grew  faster  than  the  labor input,  labor 
productivity  is positive  (at  1.4  percent  a year).  But 
labor  productivity  is  not  representative  of  overall 
banking  productivity  if other  inputs  grew  more  rapidly 
or  slowly  than  labor.” 
Our  (rough)  estimate  of the growth  of the  real value 
of bank  physical  capital  is  1.8 percent  annually  with 
the  real value  of demand  deposits  falling by 3.5  per- 
cent,  time  and  savings  deposits  growing  by  5.9  per- 
9 This  result  is  seen  in  unpublished  data  on  the  six  separate 
components  of QT  (described  in the  Appendix)  from  the  BLS. 
r” Real  labor  input  is from  the  BLS  series  on number  of workers 
in  banking.  The  number  of full-time  equivalent  workers  from 
the  Call  Repwt  grew  by  only  1.6 percent  a year  over  the  same 
period. 
rr The  bank  labor  productivity  series  derived  in  Baily  and 
Gordon  (1988),  p.  395,  cannot  be  used  for  comparison  here. 
This  is because  their  measure  of bank  output  growth,  derived 
from  National  Income  and  Product  Account  data,  is itself  based 
on the  growth  of the  labor  input.  Thus  labor productivity  growth 
will  be  zero  by  definition  as  the  growth  in  bank  output  equals 
that  of  the  labor  input. 
cent,  and purchased  funds  growing  by 3.1  percent.iz 
The  net  result  is  that  the  cumulative  level  of total 
factor  productivity  (TFP),  using  the  QT  transactions 
flow output  measure,  is below  that  for labor  produc- 
tivity.  A similar  result  occurs  when  TFP  is derived 
using  the  QD  real  balance  stock  output  measure. 
Overall,  neither  measure  of total  factor  productivity 
in  a  production-based  growth  accounting  model 
shows  any  growth13  while  the  BLS  labor  produc- 
tivity  measure  grows  by  1.4  percent  a year.14 
A  Cost-Based  Measure  of 
Banking  Productivity 
In  a cost-based  growth  accounting  approach  (see 
Box  Z), input  prices  are used  in place  of input  quan- 
tities  and  costs  are  attached  to producing  bank  out- 
put.  The  productivity  results  using  both  output 
measures  in  a  cost  model  are. shown  in  Figure  3. 
While  the  time  pattern  of the  productivity  indexes 
differ over  1977-87,  they  start  and  end  at almost  the 
same  points  so their  annual  average  growth  rates  are 
again  quite  similar,  only  this  time  they  are  slightly 
positive-a  0.6  percent  growth  rate  for QT  and  0.5 
percent  for  QD.ls 
The  differences  in productivity  estimates  between 
the  production  and  cost  approaches  can  be  seen 
in  Figure  4.  Total  factor  productivity  estimates 
I2 The  real value  of these  three  funds  categories  is the  nominal 
value divided  by the  GNP  deflator.  The  real value of bank  capital 
is  described  in  the  Appendix. 
‘3 More  specifically,  TFP  using  QT  (QD)  in  the  production- 
based  growth  accounting  model  has  a  growth  rate  of  -0.0 
(-0.07)  percent.  The  difference  in TFP  using  QD  versus  QT 
is  directly  related  to  QD  being  flat  in  the  late  1970s  but  ex- 
periencing  more  rapid  growth  than  QT  in  the  mid-1980s  (see 
Figure  1). 
I4 Two  alternative  deflators  for  the  replacement  price  of bank 
physical  capital  were  used  for illustration.  These  were  the  GNP 
deflator  and  the  ratio  of current  capital  expenditures  (historical 
depreciation)  to the  book  value  of physical  capital.  For  the  QT 
output  measure,  average  annual  TFP  was  -0.28  percent  and 
-0.58  percent,  respectively  (rather  than  -0.0  percent  as 
reported  above).  For  the  QD  output  measure,  these  rates  were 
-0.35  percent  and  -0.64  percent  (rather  than  -0.07  percent 
as  reported).  All  of  these  results  use  the  BLS  series  on  the 
number  of  banking  workers  rather  than  the  (slower  growing) 
number  of full-time  equivalent  workers  from  the  CaLRepwt.  Use 
of the  CaLReporr  labor  data  would  change  the  QT  productivity 
growth  rate  from  -0.0  percent  to  0.06  percent  and  the  QD 
measure  from  -0.07  percent  to  0.13  percent. 
is As in Figure  2, the  divergence  between  the  two TFP  estimates 
in Figure  x is due  to QD  being  flat in the  late  1970s  but  having 
a hieher  arowth  rate  than  OT  in  the  mid  1980s.  Also.  use  of 
alter\ativi  deflators  for the v&e  of bank  physical  capital  resulted 
in slighdy  lower  productivity  growth  rates  (a result  similar  to that 
obtained  for  the  production-based  measure  of  banking 
productivity-see  previous  footnote). 
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derived  from  output  and  input  quantities  in  Figure 
2 are contrasted  with  those  based  on output  cost  and 
input  prices  in  Figure  3.  Results  from. the  produc- 
tion  approach  suggest  that  productivity  was  mostly 
negative  or zero  over the period  and therefore  slightly 
lower  than  the  cost  approach,  which  yielded  results 
showing  zero  to slightly positive  productivity  growth. 
In  either  case,  the  results  show  very  low  produc- 
tivity  growth,  much  lower  than  the  annual  1.4  per- 
cent  advance  suggested  in the  BLS  labor productivity 
series  (Figure  2). 
IV. 
ECONOMETRIC  ESTIMATES  OF 
BANKING  PRODUCTIVITY 
No  studies,  to  our  knowledge,  have  attempted 
to  econometrically  estimate  TFP  for  U.S.  banks.16 
Those  U.S.  studies  that  do  exist  have,  instead, 
estimated  only  the  effect  of technical  change.  In  a 
standard  (translog)  cost  function  context,  In  C  = 
f(ln  Q,  In  Pi,  t),  technical  advance-indexed  by 
time  t-is  expressed  as  -&-iC/&  while  scale 
economies  are &rC/alnQ.  Total  factor  productivity 
is  the  combined  effect  of  these  two  measures,  ad- 
justed  for  the  change  in  output  (dlnQ),  or: 
(5)  TFP  =  -&KY&  +  (1 -alnC/&Q)  dlnQ. 
Estimates  of  technical  change  in  banking  have 
ranged  from  0.96  percent  a year  over  198086  for 
a  panel  of  219  large  banks  (Hunter  and  Timme, 
I6 Two  studies  do  exist  for  other  countries;  one  for  Canada 
(Parsons,  Go&b,  and  Denny,  1990) and  another  for Israel (Kim 
and  Weiss,  1989). 
forthcoming)  to  -0.90  percent  over  1977-88  for  a 
panel  of 683  banks  accounting  for  two-thirds  of all 
bank  assets  (Humphrey,  forthcoming).i7  In both  of 
these  studies,  the  scale  economy  estimate  was  so 
close  to  1.00  that  the  scale  adjustment  to  TFP  in 
(5) has  only  a small  effect  (altering  the  annual  values 
above to  1.05  and  -  1  .Ol  percent,  respectively).  As 
seen  in the table,  the  econometric  estimates  of bank- 
ing TFP  lie on  either  side  of those  from  the  growth 
accounting  approach.  Even  so,  all the  estimates  are 
relatively  small,  much  less  than  one  might  have  ex- 
pected  a primi.‘* 
V. 
WHY WAS MEASURED  BANKING 
PRODUCTIVITY  So Low  OVER 
THE LAST DECADE? 
Cash Management  and Deregulation: 
The  Loss of Low-Cost Deposits 
In  the  late  197Os,  historically  high  interest  rates 
greatly  increased  the  use  of cash  management  tech- 
niques  by corporations.  This  meant  large  reductions 
I7 The  -0.90  percent  figure is from one  of the  preferred  models 
estimated  where  bank  physical  capital  is treated  as a quasi-fixed 
input  and  a time-specific  dummy  variable  is used  (instead  of a 
simple  time  trend)  to reflect  technical  change.  Two  other  studies 
of U.S.  bank  technical  change  exist  (Hunter  and  Timme,  1986; 
Evanoff,  Israilevich,  and  Merris,  1989)  but  these  were  con- 
cerned  with  only  operating  costs-not  total  costs-and  are 
therefore  not  comparable  with  the  analysis  here. 
i* Indeed,  the  positive  productivity  growth  rate from  the  Hunter 
and  Timme  (forthcoming)  study  can  be  turned  into  a  small 
negative  value  when  two  deposit  interest  rates  are  specified  in 
their  model-one  for  core  deposits,  the  other  for  purchased 
funds-rather  than  using  the  purchased  funds  rate  for  both  as 
they  did  (see  Humphrey,  forthcoming,  for  details). 
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Growth  Accounting  Measures of Banking Productivitya 
Production Approach: 
Total  Factor Productivity 
Bank  output  (Q)  is produced  by  combining 
the  real value  of capital  (K), labor  (L),  demand 
deposits  (D),  small  time  and  savings  deposits 
(S),  and  purchased  funds  (F)  inputs  according 
to  some  production  relation  that  changes  in 
efficiency  (A) over  time:  Q  =  A f(K,  L,  D,  S, 
F).  Expressed  in  terms  of  growth  rates,  the 
growth  in  total  factor  productivity  (A/A)  is 
defined  to  be  the  difference  between  output 
growth  and  the  expenditure  share  (wi,  i  =  K, 
L,  D,  S,  F) weighted  average  of the  growth  in 
inputs: 
Total  Factor  Productivity 
(1)  klA  =  Q/Q  -  w&K  -  w&/L 
-  w&)/D  -  w&/S  -  w&F 
where  for  Xi  =  Q,  K,  L,  D,  S,  F: 
%/Xi  =  an  annual  growth  rate  expressed 
as  the  index  Xit/Xit - 1, where 
t  is  time. 
The  use  of  expenditure  share  weights  (wi) 
presumes  that  the  observed  input  prices-the 
rental  price  of capital,  the  wage  rate,  and  the 
a This  discussion  is  drawn  from  Hulten  (1986). 
user  cost  of demand  deposits,  time  and  savings 
deposits,  and purchased  funds-equal  the  value 
marginal  product  of  each  input  to  the  bank. 
When  the  wi  sum  to  1.00,  there  is  constant 
returns  to  scale.b  The  productivity  measure 
(1)  reflects  total  factor  productivity  (TFP) 
because  the  productivity  effects  of all inputs  to 
the  bank  are  being  accounted  for,  along  with 
returns  to  scale.  While  TFP  is the  most  com- 
prehensive  measure  of productivity,  it  is  also 
the  most  difficult  to  compute  because  of  the 
data  required. 
Multifactor  and Single-Factor 
(Labor)  Productivity 
When  more  aggregative  productivity 
measures  are  derived,  such  as for all manufac- 
turing  or  all services,  intermediate  inputs  are 
assumed  to  net  out  so  only  capital  and  labor 
inputs  are  used.  The  resulting  measure  is 
called  multifactor  productivity: 
b In  the  econometric  approach  to  measuring  produc- 
tivitv.  the  wr are estimated  statisticallv  and  need  not  sum  , 
to  1:oO.  In  the  growth  accounting  approach  used  here, 
the  observed  expenditure  shares  will  sum  to  1.00  by 
definition,  imposing  constant  returns  to scale.  This  restric- 
tion  should  only  have  a small  effect  on  the  results  since 
numerous  cross-section  banking  studies  either  support 
constant  costs  at  the  mean  of  all  banks  or  are  within 
5 percentage  points  of it (so the  cost  elasticity  of output 
ranges  from  slight  economies  of .95 to slight  diseconomies 
of 1.05).  See  the  surveys  of Mester  (1987),  Clark  (1988), 
and  Humphrey  (1990). 
in idle  demand  deposit  balances  which  did  not  pay 
explicit  interest.  The  process  is  described  and 
documented  in  Porter,  Simpson,  and  Mauskopf 
(1979)  and  can  be  seen  in  Figure  5.  Increased  use 
of cash  management  techniques  has  emerged  as the 
dominant  explanation  for  the  unexpectedly  slow 
growth  in the  monetary  aggregates  during  the  1970s. 
To  compensate  for  the  loss  of  demand  deposits, 
banks  came  to rely  more  heavily  on higher-cost  pur- 
chased  funds.  Such  a shift would  have  raised  the  real 
average  cost  per  dollar  of  bank  assets  even  if  all 
input  prices  had  remained  constant.  Since  real 
average  cost  (corrected  for  input  price  changes)  is 
the  inverse  of  productivity,  measured  TFP  would 
have  fallen  for  this  reason  alone. 
The  negative  cost  effects  from  corporate  cash 
management  were  continued  with  the  banking 
deregulation  of the  early  1980s.  Deregulation  per- 
mitted  noncorporate  bank  customers  to switch  from 
demand  deposits  to interest-earning  Negotiable  Order 
of Withdrawal  (NOW)  and  Money  Market  Deposit 
Accounts  (MMDAs).  These  new  instruments  in- 
hibited  the  growth  of demand  deposits,  shifting  the 
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(2)  k’lA*  =  G/Q  -  w&K  -  w&/L 
where  WK +  WL =  1.00. 
The  least comprehensive  measure  of produc- 
tivity  involves  only  the  productivity  of  labor 
(LP)  or  output  per  unit  of labor  input:  LP  = 
Q/L.  The  growth  in labor  productivity  is ex- 
pressed  as  a  reduced  version  of  (1)  or  (2): 
Labor  Productivity 
(3)  tiP/LP  =  o/Q  -  w&/L. 
Clearly,  the  growth  of labor  productivity  in (3) 
will only  equal  the  growth  in TFP  in (1) when 
labor is the only input  (i.e.,  WL =  1  .OO)  or when 
the  growth  pf othe:  inputs  are  equal  to that  for 
labor  (i.e.,  L/L  =  K/K  =  D/D  =  S/S  =  F/F). 
Cost  Approach: 
Total  Factor Productivity 
All of the  above  equations  showing  produc- 
tivity  growth  in terms  of a production  function 
have  a corresponding  cost  function  represen- 
tation.  That  is,  productivity  can  alternatively 
be  expressed  as the  residual  growth  in average 
cost  not  accounted  for  by  the  growth  in input 
prices  over  time.  In  simple  terms,  total  factor 
productivity  in  a  cost  function  context  (B/B) 
represents  shifts  in the  average  cost  curve  after 
controlling  for  changes  in  input  prices: 
Total  Factor  Productivity 
(4)  B/B  =  (e/C  -  Q/Q)  -  WKPK/PK 
-  w,jL/PL  -  w&D/PD 
-  w&PS  -  w&F/PF 
where: 
c/C  -  d/Q  =  the  growth  rate  of  average 
cost,  expressed  as  the 
growth  in total  cost  less the 
growth  in  output;  and 
$X/PX  =  the  growth  rates  of  factor 
input  prices  and  the  user 
cost  of  funds,  X  =  K,  L, 
D,  S,  F.C 
Under  constant  returns  to  scale,  productivity 
growth  using  the  production  relationship  in (1) 
equals  minus  one  times  the productivity  growth 
from  the  cost  relationship  in  (4)  or  klA  = 
-  B/B.d 
’ The  measurement  of these  variables  is discussed  in the 
Appendix. 
d k/A  is  positive  because.  increases  in  productivity  in 
(1) increases  output  while  B/B is negative  as increases  in 
productivity  in  (4)  reduces  cost. 
deposit  expansion  which  did  occur  into  interest- 
earning  time  and  savings  deposits  (see  Figure  5).19 
Prior  to  deregulation,  banks  had  substituted  con- 
venient  branch  offices,  service  personnel,  and 
nonpriced  services  (e.g.,  free  checking)  for  their 
inability  to  pay  something  close  to .a  market  rate 
on  demand,  savings,  and  small  time  deposits 
(Evanoff,  1988).  Once  deregulation  removed  interest 
rate  ceilings  and permitted  consumer  interest  check- 
ing,  banks  quickly  paid  higher  rates  for  the  same 
funds.  From  a cost  standpoint,  banks  subsequently 
found  themselves  to  be  “overbranched.”  The  pro- 
fitability  of their  deposit  base  fell  from  $61  billion 
in  1980,  in  constant  1988  dollars,  to  $4  billion  in 
1988  (Berger  and  Humphrey,  forthcoming). 
I9 While  checks  can be written  on NOW  and  MMDA  balances, 
they  are not  (legally  speaking)  available  on  demand  and  so have 
been  classified  with  time  and  savings  deposits  in  the  data 
collected  by  regulatory  authorities. 
In effect,  corporate  cash management  and deregula- 
tion  removed  banks’  virtual  monopoly  control  over 
zero-interest  checking  accounts  and low-interest  small 
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consumer  time  and  savings  deposits  (as rate  ceilings 
on these  deposits  were  also removed).aO  Subsequent 
competition  induced  banks  to  shift  from  low-to 
higher-interest  cost  funds  inputs  without  a fully off- 
setting  reduction  in  factor  inputs  used  to  provide 
branch  convenience  and  other  low-priced  deposit 
services.  In  addition,  since  the  deposit  services 
provided  were  largely  unchanged  as  corporations 
conserved  on  idle  balances  and  consumers  shifted 
from  one  type  of checking  account  to another,  either 
measure  of bank  output  used  here  would  have  been 
stable.  With  costs  rising  but  output  stable,  costs  per 
unit  of measured  output  should  rise,  even  when  cor- 
rected  for  input  price  changes,  lowering  TFP. 
In addition  to cash  management  and  deregulation, 
the  inflation  of the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  also 
contributed  to  the  rise  in  bank  costs.  During  this 
inflationary  period,  some  idle  demand  balances  and 
low-cost  time  and  savings  deposits  would  have  con- 
tinued  to  shift  to  Money  Market  Mutual  Funds 
(MMMFs)  and  been  replaced  by  higher  cost  CDs 
sold  by  banks  to  the  MMMFs.  But  in order  to  con- 
trol  operating  costs,  MMMFs  restricted  the  number 
of  checks  written  per  month  and  specified  high 
minimum  amounts.  Such  limitations  would  likely 
have  prevented  any  substantial  disintermediation  of 
demand  deposits  and thereby  helped  keep  bank  costs 
relatively  low.  Since  over  80 percent  of the  deregu- 
lated bank  balances  were  NOW  and MMDA  deposits 
2o Another  aspect  of  deregulation  was  that  thrift  institutions 
obtained  the  ability  to  offer checkable  deposits.  This  increased 
competition  and  contributed  to the  reduction  in banks’  monopoly 
power  over  this  low-cost  product. 
(which  experienced  the  largest  rate  increases  follow- 
ing  deregulation),  it is clear  that  the  great  majority 
of  the  negative  effects  for  banks  seen  during  this 
period  are  due  to  deregulation,  not  inflation. 
This  analysis,  we believe,  explains  why researchers 
have  failed  to  observe  much  positive  net  technical 
change  or productivity  growth  in banking  during  the 
last  decade.  Going  beyond  this  explanation,  part  of 
the  problem  is also  related  to  our  inability  to  accu- 
rately  capture  all potentially  important  aspects  of bank 
output.  If branch  convenience  and the  continued  pro- 
vision  of underpriced  deposit  services  are valued  by 
users,  then  certainly  some  of the  (now  extra)  costs 
incurred  by banks  in providing  “unnecessarily”  high 
levels  of  these  services  after  deregulation  have 
served  to increase  the  quality  of bank  output.  If one 
adopts  this  view,  then  what  appears  to be  a produc- 
tivity  decrease  may  instead  be  the  result  of under- 
stating  output  growth  as benefits  received  by  bank 
depositors  rose  relative  to  their  pre-deregulation 
level. 
An  analogous  situation  occurred  in  the  electric 
utility  industry  during  the  1970s.  Expensive  pollu- 
tion  control  restrictions  were  mandated  for  electric 
utilities  and,  although  these  costs  were  largely  made 
up  by  rate  increases,  measured  output  of  this 
industry-kilowatt-hours-did  not  rise  commen- 
surately.  As  a result,  measured  total  factor  produc- 
tivity  was  seen  to  fall  (e.g.,  Gallop  and  Roberts, 
1983).  But  if cleaner  air  resulted,  then  the  quality 
of this  industry’s  output  actually  rose  but  will not  be 
captured  in the  output  measure  used.  It is argued  here 
that  the  same  sort  of  thing  occurred  in  banking. 
Market-Share  Reasons  for Not  Reducing 
Branch Convenience  as Interest Costs  Rose 
It  is easy  to  argue  that  the  cost  effect  of deregu- 
lation  could  have  been  minimized  if all banks  had 
pared  their  branch  operations  more  rapidly  and  to 
a greater  degree.  As it was,  the  real  deposit/branch 
ratio  was  still  falling  until  1982,  when  it  reached  a 
minimum  of around  $28  million  in core  deposits  per 
branch  office.  This  meant  that  banks  were  still 
effectively  building  branches  more  rapidly  than  its 
customer  base  was  expanding,  increasing  conven- 
ience  (and  operating  costs)  in the  process.  While  the 
employee/branch  ratio  was  more  or less  falling  con- 
tinually  over  this  period,  only  after  1982  did the  real 
deposit/branch  ratio start  to rise,  reaching  around  $36 
million  in  1988. 
Seemingly,  market  share  considerations  inhibited 
a more  rapid  and  comprehensive  reduction  in bank 
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tion  rose.  Since  choice  of a bank  by  a depositor  is 
largely  based  on convenience  (according  to industry 
surveys),  a dramatic  and  profitable  reduction  in one 
banks  branching  network  would  serve  also to expand 
market  share  and profits  at competing  banks  that  re- 
tained  their  branch  networks.  In the  end,  both  sets 
of banks  would  have  experienced  higher  profit  rates 
in the  short  run,  but  market  shares  and  profit  lfrr~ls 
would  have been  redistributed  away from those  banks 
that  cut  their  branch  networks  the  most.  Thus 
most  banks  seemingly  chose  to  sacrifice  short-term 
profits  in order  to maintain  market  share  and  hoped 
that  long-term  profit  would  follow  as deposit  growth 
continued  to  exceed  the  establishment  of  new 
branches. 
Outlook  for the Future 
The  outlook  is  not  very  bright.  First,  the  wave 
of  interstate  mergers  that  have  occurred  already, 
along  with  those  expected  during  the  1990s  (when 
many  states  will eliminate  their  existing  out-of-state 
merger  barriers),  bring  with  them  costly  “one-time” 
expenditures  to integrate  back  office operations  and 
standardize  the banking  products  offered.  While these 
expenditures  will permit  some  cost  reductions  to be 
realized,  they  will also add considerable  software  and 
equipment  expenses. 
Second,  the  problem  of excess  banking  capacity, 
as  evidenced  by  too  many  branches,  cannot  easily 
be  solved  as long  as failed or failing banks  and thrifts 
continue  to be purchased  by institutions  with the bulk 
of their  own  branch  network  typically  outside  of the 
purchased  bank’s  deposit  market  area.  Rarely  do 
regulators  simply  close  a failed bank’s  branches,  and 
rarely  do  banks  in  the  same  market  area  purchase 
branches  simply  to  close  them.  Instead,  a  failed 
banks  branch  network  is typically  sold to an institu- 
tion  outside  the  market  area  and  the  buyer  typically 
keeps  most  of the  branches  open,  perpetuating  the 
oversupply  problem. 
If the  antitrust  market  concentration  restrictions 
on  bank  mergers  were  considerably  relaxed,  then 
costs  associated  with  overlapping  branch  networks 
would  fall.  Such  cost  reductions  result  when  large 
competitors  in  the  same  deposit  market  area  are 
encouraged  to  acquire  each  other  and  close  excess 
branch  offices  (e.g.,  as  occurred  with  Cracker  and 
Wells  Fargo  in California).  While  market  concentra- 
tion  would  rise,  it is not  clear  that  increased  concen- 
tration  would  or  has  led  to  much  uncompetitive 
behavior  in the  form  of reduced  price  competition 
and  increased  profits.  Indeed,  recent  research  indi- 
cates  that  low costs  are the  dominant  explanation  for 
higher  bank  profits  in concentrated  markets  (Timme 
and Yang,  1990),  not  concentration  itself as has long 
been  asserted.  Overall,  given  the  two  problems  just 
outlined,  it is hard  to be  optimistic  about  the  future 
of productivity  in banking.  The  most  likely outcome 
is continued  slow  growth  until  the  industry  is  able 
to shrink  itself sufficiently  through  greater  reductions 
in  operating  costs  per  dollar  of  deposits  or  assets. 
Thus  future  productivity  growth  will more  likely stem 
from  reducing  current  excess  costs  than  from  further 
technological  progress. 
VI. 
SUMMARY 
Measured  productivity  in  banking  over  the  last 
decade  has  been  growing  at  a very  low  rate.  Using 
aggregate  data over  1977-87,  it is estimated  that  total 
factor  productivity  growth  has  only  been  between 
-0.07  to  0.60  percent  a  year?  These  estimates 
are  based  on  a  nonparametric  growth  accounting 
approach  using first a production  function  and second 
a  cost  function.  These  results  were  robust  to  a 
number  of  influences  (three  different  deflators  for 
deriving  the  real  value  of bank  physical  capital  and 
two  different  labor  employment  series).  Impor- 
tantly,  these  results  are  also  robust  to  using  two 
different  indicators  of  banking  output:  one  a  flow 
measure  of  deposit  and  loan  transactions  and  the 
other  a stock  measure  of the  real  value  of deposits 
and  loan  balances. 
The  primary  explanation  for the  low productivity 
growth  experienced  has been  the  shift in zero-interest 
cost  corporate  and  some  consumer  demand  deposits 
to  purchased  funds  in  the  1970s  (a  result  of  im- 
proved  corporate  cash  management  techniques, 
higher  interest  rates,  and  the  rise  of Money  Market 
Mutual  Funds),  plus a later shift of consumer  demand 
deposits  to interest-earning  and  checkable  time  and 
savings  deposits  in  the  1980s  (a  result  of  banking 
deregulation  which  removed  interest  rate  ceilings  on 
time  and savings  and established  new  interest-earning 
checking  accounts  at both  banks  and  thrifts).  These 
developments  significantly  raised  the  cost  of  bank 
loanable  funds.  However,  banks  did  not  fully offset 
these  higher  costs  by  lowering  operating  expenses, 
reducing  branch  and  service  convenience,  to  com- 
pensate  for the  higher  interest  being  paid.  It is argued 
that  market  share  considerations  limited  this 
response. 
21 Similarly  low positive  to low negative  annual  rates  of produc- 
tivity growth  have  also been  found  over a longer  period,  1967-87 
(Humphrey,  1991). 
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necessary  is a substantial  reduction  in operating  costs, 
since  banking  no longer  has a virtual  monopoly  over 
zero-interest  checking  accounts  and low-interest  small 
consumer  time  and  savings  deposits.  Future  bank 
mergers,  while reducing  costs  in some  instances,  will 
also  lead  to  expensive  “one-time”  expenditures  to 
integrate  back  office  operations  and  standardize 
banking  products.  And  bank  failures,  rather  than 
removing  excess  branch  office  capacity  as  would 
occur  in other  industries,  have  tended  to perpetuate 
the  overcapacity  conditions  that  have  led  to  higher 
costs.  Increases  in banking  productivity,  when  they 
come,  are  more  likely  to  result  from  reductions  in 
current  operating  costs  and  a  rationalization  of 
overlapping  branch  networks  than.  from  further 
technological  progress. 
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Availability  of Data  and Measurement  of Banking Output and Price Indexes 
Data  Availability 
Aggregate  data  on the  number  of deposit  accounts 
from  the  FDIC  are only  available  for two years  over 
the  past  ten,  while  no  aggregate  data  are  available 
on  the  number  of  (new  plus  outstanding)  loan  ac- 
counts.  While  numbers  of deposit  and  loan accounts 
are  reported  in the  Federal  Reserve’s  annual  Func- 
tional  Cost Analysis  survey,  the  data  cannot  be  used 
in  a  time-series  analysis.  First,  the  sampled  banks 
change  by  upwards  to  15 to  20  percent  each  year 
so  that  a consistent  time  series  covering  the  same 
set  of banks  is not  available.  Second,  the  very  largest 
banks,  those  that  service  the  largest  number  of such 
accounts  and  experience  the  greatest  rate  of growth, 
are  not  included  in  the  survey. 
Indexes of Bank Output 
The  transactions  flow  index  of  banking  output 
(QT)  was developed  by the Bureau of Labor  Statistics 
(BLS,  1989).  This  index  measures  demand  deposit 
output  by the  number  of checks  and electronic  funds 
transfers  processed,  which  reflects  the  debiting  and 
crediting  of demand  deposit  accounts  as well  as the 
payment  processing  and  accounting  activities 
associated  with these  activities.  Similarly,  savings  and 
small  denomination  time  deposit  output  is captured 
by measuring  deposit  and withdrawal  activity in these 
accounts.  Loan  output  is represented  by the  number 
of new  real  estate  loans,  consumer  installment  and 
credit  card  loans,  and  commercial,  industrial,  and 
agricultural  loans  made  during  the  year.  Lastly,  trust 
and fiduciary activities  are assumed  to be proportional 
to the  number  of trust  accounts  serviced.  Investment 
activities  are  treated  as  an  intermediate  good  and 
netted  out,  since  their  variation  has historically  been 
associated  with  secondary  reserves  (where  securities 
are  sold  to fund  higher-than-expected  loan  demand 
or deposit  withdrawal  activity  and vice versa).  In any 
event,  investment  activities,  plus the  provision  of safe 
deposit  boxes,  investment  advice,  and insurance,  ac- 
count  for  only  a little  more  than  4 percent  of bank 
employment,  and  their  omission  is not  believed  (by 
the  BLS)  to have  a significant  effect  on the  variation 
in measured  output.  Employment  shares  were  used 
to weight  these  separate  transaction  flows into a.  single 
index  of  banking  output. 
The  alternative  index  of the  real  value  of deposit 
and  loan  account  balances  (QD)  was  developed  by 
the  author.  It  represents  a  cost-share  weighted 
average  of the  dollar  value  of five  deposit  (demand 
deposits,  small  time  and  savings  deposits)  and  loan 
categories  (real  estate  loans,  consumer  installment 
and credit  card loans,  and commercial,  industrial,  and 
agricultural  loans)  from  aggregate  Call Report  data. 
The  cost-share  weights  are from the  annual Functional 
Cost ha/y.&  surveys  for banks  with  more  than  $200 
million  in deposits.  Nominal  values  of these  five out- 
put  categories  were  deflated  by the  GNP  deflator  to 
approximate  real  values. 
Total  Cost  of Output and Input Prices 
Total  cost  is  from  the  Cab  Report  and  excludes 
double  counting  at  the  aggregate  level  by  deleting 
the  cost  of purchased  federal  funds  (see  text).  The 
price  of capital  is a bank-weighted  average  of the  new 
contract  cost  per  square  foot  of  bank  and  office 
building  space  for nine  regions  of the  United  States 
reported  in  F.W.  Dodge,  Constmction  Potentiaf.. 
Bdetin  (various  years).  Other  capital  price  deflators 
were  also used  and their  effects  are noted  in the  text 
(footnote  14). The  real value  of bank  physical  capital 
used  is  book  value  deflated  by  the  capital  price 
index.  The  price  of labor is total expenditure  on labor 
divided  by the  number  of full-time equivalent  workers 
(both  from  the  Cal..  Report).  The  prices  per  dollar  of 
each  of the  three  funds  categories  are in terms  of user 
costs,  composed  of the  interest  rate  paid  (i), the  per 
dollar  reserve  requirement  (RR),  and  the  per  dollar 
service  charge  income  (SC).  Following  Hancock 
(1986),  but neglecting  FDIC  deposit  insurance  costs, 
user  costs  (UC)  are  in general  UC  =  (i  +  rFF’  RR 
-  SC)/(l  +  r&,  where  rm  is  the  rate  on  federal 
funds,  a market  rate.  The  denominator  adjusts  for 
the fact that the numerator  costs are only fully realized 
at  the  end  of a one-year  period,  rather  than  at  the 
beginning.  RR  and  SC  are  small  for  time  and  sav- 
ings  deposits  and  are  difficult  to  separate  out  from 
those  on demand  deposits,  for which  i is zero.  With 
these  considerations  in mind,  our user  costs  are: UCo 
=  (rFF RR  -  sc)/(l  +  rFF); UCS  =  k/(1  +  rFF); 
and  UCF  =  iF/(I  +  rm).  In  implementation,  total 
costs  and  the  two  factor  input  prices  were  deflated 
by  the  GNP  deflator  to  reflect  real  values.  User 
costs  are  already  in real terms  (see  Hancock,  1986). 
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